Passwords, keys and certificates, encrypted before they leave the device, with Aı that watches the vault and never the secrets.
Marrinn Vault replaces the password spreadsheet, the API key in a shared inbox and the one person who knows the production credentials. Every secret is encrypted end to end, shared by team and logged.
Secrets leak through ordinary work.
A key pasted into a chat. A password reused across four systems. A contractor who left in March and still has access.
- Credentials in chat
Once a key is in a message thread, it stays in search results, backups and exports.
- The shared spreadsheet
Every copy holds every password, unencrypted and unversioned.
- Leavers keep access
Offboarding revokes the account, not the passwords they saved.
- No record
A browser password manager was not designed for shared production infrastructure.
Encrypted before it leaves the device.
Vault is zero-knowledge. The browser or app encrypts each secret with a key derived from your master passphrase. The server stores ciphertext only.
Infrastructure
On your deviceOn the server
- Production database, root
7f3a91c2e04b - Stripe live secret key
c81d5e07a3f9 - TLS certificate, wildcard
2b9e64d10c8a - SMTP relay credentials
e5470fb92d16 - Cloud provider API token
9a13c7e8b05d
Access log
Grace opened Cloud provider API token09:14
5 secrets · shared with Platform team (4 members) · last opened 2 hours ago
- End-to-end encrypted
- The server never sees plaintext.
- Zero-knowledge
- Not even we can read your vault.
- Complete access log
- Who opened what, and when.
- Your infrastructure
- On-premise, or hosted by us.
The server holds ciphertext only.
Vault encrypts on the client, keeps one key per vault and shares keys with people, never copies of passwords.
- PlaintextOn your device only
- CiphertextThe only thing the server stores
- Wrapped keyOne vault key, wrapped for each person
The secure path is the quick path.
A password manager works only when people use it. Vault makes the secure action the fast one, so nobody returns to the spreadsheet.
- Every read is recordedCloud provider API token
••••••••••••Grace opened Cloud provider API token
Secrets stay masked until someone opens one, and the read goes in the access log.
- View, use, edit or manage
- ANAnaViewUseEditManage
- BEBenViewUseEditManage
- CHChloeViewUseEditManage
- COContractorViewUseEditManageExpires
Four levels of access, and each can expire on its own.
- Rotation and rollbackProduction database, root
Rotation due in 3 days
- Version 1
- Version 2 current
- Version 3
A reminder when a secret is due, full version history and one-click rollback.
Vault stores passwords, API keys, SSH keys, certificates, database strings, secure notes and files. It runs as a browser extension, desktop and mobile apps, and a CLI for pipelines and servers.
The assistant reads metadata, never secrets.
The AI layer reads access patterns, secret age, sharing and breach feeds. It cannot read your secrets. It proposes, and people decide.
Which secrets should I rotate first?
Risk review, from metadata only
- Stripe live secret keyNever rotated, shared company-wide
- Production database, rootShared with every member of the team
- SMTP relay credentialsAppears in a breach feed
Proposed for the security lead to approve. The assistant cannot read the values.
Your secrets, in your jurisdiction.
Marrinn Ltd is a UK company. You decide where Vault runs.
- Self-hosted via DockerInside your own network. Unlocking needs no connection to Marrinn.
- Hosted by MarrinnIn the region written into your contract.
Zero-knowledge either way. Marrinn cannot read your vault.
Get the passwords out of the spreadsheet.
We show Vault on your own structure: teams, environments and your most sensitive credentials. We reply within one UK business day.
